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Abstract 
An increasing number of Android devices are be-
ing infected and at risk of becoming part of a botnet. 
Among all types of botnets, control and cornmand 
based botnets are very popular. In this papet; we 
;mroduce an effective and efficient method to ddect 
SMS-based control commands ftvm infected Android 
devices. Specifically, we rely on the important radio 
activities recorded in Android log files. These radio 
activities are currently overlooked by researchers. 
We show the effectiveness of our rnethod by using 
the examples frorn published literature. Our method 
requires much less user knowledge but is more 
generic than traditional approaches. 
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1. Introduction 
With the increasing number of botnets and wide-
spread of malware, a large number of Android de-
vices are being infected and thus become a part of 
botnet. Android devices are attractive and vulnerable, 
due to their design features as a free and open-source 
operating system for mobile devices [1]. Further-
more, Android systems have a weak security model 
in which special permissions are granted easily to 
perform malicious tasks. 
The interest of building a botnet with mobile 
devices is shown fairly recent. Many mobile devices 
become part of command and control botnets [2]. 
Zeng et a!. [3] build a simple botnet with Jess than 
200 control commands on a mobile network. They 
also show that even if an innocent user deletes a 
control message sent via SMS, the command has 
been regardlessly executed upon receipt of the SMS. 
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Traditional approaches to unveil the existence of 
a bot take a long time. Our research question is to 
effectively and efficiently detect the control com-
mands from an Android device transmitted within a 
botnet. We take advantage of Android Jog files which 
are embedded in the kernel level, and in particular, 
the radio activity logs which record many important 
system events related to botnet activities. Our contri-
butions in this paper include a detailed introduction 
of the Android log system and the identification of 
three important radio activities associated with SMS-
based botnet activities. Our new detection method 
requires much less user knowledge but is more 
generic than traditional reverse engineering approach 
to decompile the binary files into source codes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 lists the related work on Android malware 
analysis; Section 3 illustrates Android log files; 
Section 4 describes our detection method, our exper-
iments and the results; and we conclude in Section 
5. 
2. Literature Review 
There are three commonly used malware analysis 
approaches for Android devices - reviewing source 
codes, applying a sandbox and analyzing Android 
kernel infonnation. Reviewing the source codes of a 
program is a reliable approach for analyzing Android 
malware. For example, Blasco [4] analyzes an An-
droid malware package (named RU. apk) by reverse 
engineering the binary file into source codes. The 
apk package is firstly uncompressed by using a ZIP 
program; then Blasco locates the class. dex file 
from the uncompressed files; a Google tool named 
Dex2jar is then applied to convert class. dex 
to class. jar; finally, the Java decompiler jd is 
applied to retrieve source codes from class. jar. 
More specifically, the app RU, apk secretly forwards 
all incoming SMS messages to two Russian premium 
numbers. Blasco's case study shows the power of 
reverse engineering an app package apk; however, 
it is not applicable when the apk file is unavailable. 
The second approach to analyzing a botnet is to use a 
sandbox. A sandbox is injected to an Android device 
where any use of special permissions such as calling 
a phone, sending SMS, connecting to the Internet 
is handled by the sandbox instead of the handset 
[5], [6], The third approach is to analyze kernel-
level information. As revealed in [7], [8], different 
apps revoke system calls differently according to the 
recorded information in kernel-level log files. The 
collected log files contain the filtered events with all 
system calls from the target application. By using 
this method, Isohara et al. build app signatures based 
on the intensity of I/0 and process management 
operations. 
However, none of the above approaches applies to 
our case. Our reasons are threefold: It is generally 
infeasible to acquire botnet source codes for many 
botnets do not use a static binary program or an app 
package; the sandboxing technique is complicated 
and often blocks bot's activities; botnets evolve so 
quickly that fixed signatures rarely work for a long 
period of time. Inspired by all of the existing work 
we focus on the recorded behaviors of a handset. 
Lessard and Kessler [9]list a few forensic methods 
to retrieve information from an Android device. 
One of the practical combinations of techniques 
is to firstly enable USB debugging, then to gain 
the root access to the device, and lastly to create 
dd disk images of the mounted file systems on 
Android. These acquired image files can be analyzed 
with popular forensic tools such as Forensic ToolKit 
(FTK) and EnCase. However, this process is labor-
intensive and error-prone. Zhong et al. [10] use 
a customized Google map on Android device to 
retrieve an individual user's gee-spatial data which 
is then sent to the police via 30 network. Though 
sending data to the police seems to be safe and 
reliable, it brings excessive concerns of privacy and 
misuse of personal data. An alternative approach is 
to use commercially available and automated phone 
forensic tools such as Device Seizure from Paraben 
and Oxygen forensic suite. Both approaches require 
the USB debugging mode on the handset to be 
enabled. However, changing the setting of a handset 
may alter digital evidence stored onboard. And it is 
challenging to enable any write blocking mechanism 
on a handset. 
The next section will introduce Android logging 
system and log tiles. 
3. Android Log Files 
Google modified the original Linux kernel to suit 
Android. More than 160 kernel files are created or 
modified to support new 'Log Device' and 'Android 
Debug Bridge' (adb). Hence, Android systems usc 
syslog for the unmodified Linux kernel and its own 
app log for the new •Log Device' and 'Android 
Debug Bridge'. The syslog file format is defined as 
an international standard in RFC5424 [ll], and the 
app log file format is defined by Google. 
3.1. Android Syslog 
Syslog has a hierarchical structure and a simple 
syntax as follows: 
• A log file consists of multiple syslog messages. 
Each syslog message has two or three patis: 
the first part is a header; the second part is 
structured data; and the third part is an optional 
message. A white space symbol is inserted 
between each part to separate them. 
The header consists of a priority value, the 
syslog version, a timestamp, a hostname, an 
application name, a process ID and a message 
!D. 
• The structured data is a list of parameter names 
and their associated values. 
The optional message contains the detailed mes-
sage which is stored in ASCII or in UTF-8 
codes. 
• By default, a missing value is indicated by a 
hyphen symbol in ASCII. 
Comparing with a standard Linux system, An-
droid system excludes the program syslogd. So, 
the ordinary Linux log directory /var I log does 
not exist on Android; instead, an equivalent file 
proc/kmesg is created on Android for logging 
Linux kernel messages. There are two methods to 
access this file - either by using the Linux com-
mand dmesg through the 'Android Debug Bridge' 
(adb) or by directly accessing the file via the file 
system. 
Originally designed for hardware debugging pur-
poses, kernel messages mainly contain basic infor-
mation of the hardware and the operating system. 
Since these kernel messages keep track of the boot 
process, the running system processes and their 
process IDs. These messages have forensic values. 
Below is an example of kernel message from an 
Android device. Specifically, the following log en-
tries include some warning, informational and notice 
messages generated during the boot process: The 
kernel information with a timestamp is the first 
message; then the next three messages show the 
Andmid device has a ARMv7 processor and 512MB 
RAM. The fifth message shows the memory mapN 
ping; and the rest indicate the process of mounting 
three storage devices mtdblockl, mtdblock2 
and mtdblock3 as yaffs file system. 
<S>Linux version 2.6.29-gc497e41 \ 
(kroot@kennyroot.mtv.corp.google.com) \ 
(gee version 4.4.3 (GCC) ) 12 Thu Dec \ 
8 15:07:43 PST 2011 
<4>CPU: ARMv7 Processor [410fc080] \ 
revision 0 (ARMv7) 1 cr=l0c5387f 
<4>CPU: VIPT nonaliasing data cache, \ 
VIPT nonaliasing instruction cache 
<6>Memory: 512MB = 512MB total 
<S>Memory: 515712KB available (2756K \ 
code, 683K data, 108K init) 
<6>yaffs: dev is 32505856 name is \ 
"mtdblockO" 
<4>yaffs: Attempting MTD mount on 31.0\ 
' 
"mtdblockO" 
<6>yaffs: dev is 32505857 name is \ 
"mtdblockl" 
<4>yaffs: Attempting MTD mount on 31.1\ 
' 
"mtdblockl" 
<6>yaffs: dev is 32505858 name is \ 
"mtdblock2 11 
<4>yaffs: Attempting MTD mount on 31.2\ 
' 
"mtdblock2 11 
The numbers appearing in the beginning of each message 
are bounded by brackets. According to [II], each of 
these numbers indicates priority values. A priority value 
is calculated by multiplying the facility number by 8 and 
adding the severity level. And kernel messages have zero 
as their facility number. Since Android only stores kernel 
messages in syslog fonnat, the priority values in the above 
example are equal to the default syslog severity levels: 
0 Emergency: system is unusable 
I Alert: action must be taken immediately 
2 Critical: critical conditions 
3 Error: error conditions 
4 Warning: warning conditions 
5 Notice: normal but significant condition 
6 Informational: informational messages 
7 Debug: debugNJevel messages 
3.2. Android App Log 
Android app logs are handled by the Android Logging 
system, which is completely separate from the Linux kerN 
nel Jog system. Unlike hardware information, the Android 
Logging System emphasizes the status of the running 
programs on the device. It includes four basic components: 
An Android kernel driver called logger, four logging 
buffers allocated to store log messages - events, main, 
radio and system, a standalone program loge at to view 
log messages, and a programming interface (via Eclipse 
and DDMS) designed to view and filter the Jogs. 
To illustrate the Android Logging System, we use the 
picture from ll2] in Figure I. There are two devices in 
the figure- a target and a host. The target is the Android 
device whose Jogs are being analyzed, and the host is the 
computer to which the device is connected. On the target, 
the log files arc stored in the I dev /log direct01y at the 
lowest leveL Corresponding to the four Jog buffers, the 
Figure I: Android Logging System from [ 12] 
log files are /dev/log/main, /dev/log/radio, 
/dev/log/event and /dev/log/system. In 
/dev/log/radio, we often lind the log messages 
with message tags "RIL", "AT", "RILD", "RILC", 
"RILJ", and "GSM", All of the log files are 64 KB 
except that /dev/log/event is 256 KB. On each 
Android handset, the Jog sizes are fixed so that the 
newer records will replace the earlier ones. The contents 
of each record are generated with the 1 iblog library 
before they are stored in these Jog files. As shown in 
Figure I, the liblog library is in charge of recording 
all application logs. The native Android apps can directly 
access liblog, and the third-party apps should use 
the API android.util.log to access liblog. In 
addition to outputting the log messages to the log files, 
the programs may display the messages on the device 
screen via stdout and stderr channels. 
Similar to the kernel log messages, each Android Jog 
message contains multiple parts - a message tag indiN 
eating the application that the message originated from, 
a timestamp, the priority of the event represented by the 
message and the Jog message itself. The logcat tool 
chronologically sorts the events and can be invoked on the 
target or on the host through the Android Debug Bridge 
Daemon (adbd). By default, the Android logcat tool 
only outputs three parts of the log message - the priority 
tag denoted by one of the 5 letters ('E' for ERROR, 'I' 
for INFO, 'D' for DEBUG, 'W' for WARN, and 'V' for 
VERBOSE), the message tag indicating the message origin 
and the log message itself. Furthermore, the separation 
symbols vary between different parts: a slash symbol '/' is 
immediately after a priority tag and before a message tag, 
and a colon symbol ':' is immediately after the message 
tag and before the log message. 
The following examples are the outputs from logcat. 
The comm:and logcat -b ma:i.n retrieves the main 
application log /dev/log/main, and the following error 
message indicates the absence of an enor trace file: 
E/Trace (264): error opening trace \ 
file: No such file or directory (2) 
The command logcat -b events retrieves the sys-
tem events log /dev/log/events, and the following 
information message indicates the start of Android bootup 
process: 
I/boot_progress_start{36): 22060 
logcat -b radio retrieves the radio and phone-
related information log /dev/log/rad:i.o, and the fol-
lowing debugging message indicates an incoming phone 
call: 
D/AT 943) : AT< lUNG 
The command logcat ~b system retrieves the system 
debugging log /dev/log/system, and the following 
error message indicates a run-time error caused by missing 
a method: 
E/AndroidRuntime{ 8681): java.1ang.NoSuch\ 
MethodError: com.herongyang.AboutAndroid. \ 
getObbDir 
The next section shows our proposed method of using 
Android log files to detect botnet control commands via 
SMS. 
4. Using Android Logs to Detect Botnet 
Control Commands 
Our detection method is to search for radio events. Our 
reasons are I) botnet uses radio as a channel to send 
and receive short control commands to meet the need 
of frequent communications to its zombies; 2) the radio 
log on actual handsets is large enough to store generally 
a few days' telecommunication logs; 3) the address of 
destination nodes and source nodes are stored in clear text 
in the radio logs; 4) the radio logs are well kept in the 
· kernel so that a complete erase of all entries is difficult. 
Specifically, we focus on two categories in 
/dev/log/radio: The first category is to retrieve 
the device information such as D/RIL onRequest: 
GET_IMSI and D/RIL onRequest: GET_IMEI 
which retrieve the device IMSI and IMEI numbers 
respectively; the second category is to send SMS 
messages such as D/RIL onRequest: SEND_SMS. 
Our detection method is very simple but effective. We 
show two examples below. 
To carry out the experiment, we use the information of 
a prepaid Optus device and the same SMS examples from 
[3]. The first example sh011 message reads as: 
Free ringtones download at 
www.myringtone.com, using username 
VIP, password YTJiNGQxMWw to log on 
The only obscured text is "YTJiNGQxMWw" which is 
a Base-64 encoded string "a2b4dlll". Without knowing 
what this number means, we acquire the radio log of the 
recipient's device. By filtering out the irrelevant entries 
and the ones before the recipient of the SMS, we obtain 




32) : onRequest: GET_IMSI 
32): onRequest: GET_IMEI 
32): onRequest: SEND_SMS 
Now, the behavior of this apparent spam SMS triggers our 
device to retrieve system information (at least IMSI and 
IMEI numbers) and then send a new SMS to somewhere 
else. We then examine the radio log and find that our 
IMSI and IMEI numbers have been sent to an American 
number +14083631980. The following debugging message 
is located in one of the later events: 
D/AT ( 32): AT> AT+CMG$::="+14083631980"\ 
,145 1MSI~085950200100263914 \ 
IME1~353502020487979-z 
where the command "AT +CMOS" indicates that the SMS 
has been sent to +14083631980, "145" is the international 
phone number format, and the characters before "~Z" 
are the SMS body. Our findings are consistent lo the 
original paper, which the llrst SMS is a bot command 
"SEND_SYSINFO a2b4dl II". 
The second SMS is also from l3J: 
Your paypal account was hijacked (Err 
msg: NzkxMjAzNDixODExMDUyM I 83Mz). 
Respond to http://www.bhocxx.paypal.com us-
ing code Q3MDk2NDUyXzEyMzQ I Njc4 
This time, we need to concatenate the two encoded 
strings "NzkxMjAzNDlxODExMDUyM 183Mz" 
and "Q3MDk2NDUyXzEyMzQINjc4". We 
use Base-64 to decode the result string as 
"79 I 20342I 8 I I 0523_7347096452_12345678". Without 
knowing what these three numbers mean, we acquire the 
radio log of the recipient's device. By filtering out the 
irrelevant entries and the ones before the recipient of the 
SMS, we obtain the following entry: 
D/RIL ( 32} : onRequest: SEND_SMS 
Now, this apparent spam SMS lets the device send out a 
SMS. We examine the radio log and find that a blank SMS 
has been sent to an American number+ 17347096452. The 
following debugging message is located in one of the later 
events: 
D/AT ( 32): AT> AT+CMG$"""7347096452", \ 
129 -. 
where the command "AT +CMGS" indicates that the SMS 
has been sent to 7347096452, "145" is the phone num-
ber format without the country code, and the charac-
ters before wz" indicate an SMS with an empty body. 
Our findings are also consistent to the original paper, 
which the second SMS is a bot command "FIND_NODE 
79120342I8I 10523_7347096452_12345678". According 
to l3J, this command attempts to locate a bot whose ID 
is 7912034218110523 with passcode 12345678 to the bot 
whose phone number is 7347096452. 
In this section, we propose our detection method and 
apply it to treat the two disguised SMS messages. We 
successfully detect botnet control commands with the help 
of the log file /dev/log/radio. The success of our 
method relies on the integrity and trustworthiness of the 
radio log file which is currently overlooked by many 
researchers. As a simple solution to the log integrity 
problem, we have implemented an Android program which 
captures all the Jog entries in real-time and stores the log 
,entries in a SQLite database on external storage devices. 
We believe that this mitigation method would help to 
prevent the loss of Android logs. We conclude this paper 
in the next section. 
5. Conclusions and J<'uture Work 
In this paper, we explain the Android logging system in 
details. We identify a few indicative yet significant logging 
symbols to effectively detect the control commands of 
a botnet. Our method relies on the Android radio Jog 
which is overlooked by most researchers. We show the 
effectiveness of our method by using the examples from 
published literature. Our method requires much less user 
knowledge but is more generic than traditional reverse 
engineering approach. 
Our future work is to improve the current method so that 
it does not require a non-tampered radio Jog tile. Since 
validating log entries is beyond the scope of this paper, 
our next step is to Llistinguish whether a log message is 
genuine and to recover the Ueleted or altered log messages 
prior to the log analysis. 
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